Rethinking children’s agency: Power, assemblages, freedom and materiality by Gallagher, Michael
Gallagher, Michael (2019) Rethinking children’s agency: Power, assem-














Faculty	  of	  Education	  
Manchester	  Metropolitan	  University	  







Phone:	  0161	  247	  2102	  
	  
The	  published,	  copy-­‐edited	  version	  of	  this	  article	  will	  be	  available	  from	  the	  
journal	  Global	  Studies	  of	  Childhood	  
	  
If	  you	  wish	  to	  quote	  from	  the	  article,	  please	  use	  the	  published	  version	  so	  
that	  the	  pagination	  is	  correct.	  	  
	  
If	  you	  are	  unable	  to	  access	  it,	  please	  contact	  the	  author.	  	  
	  




This	  paper	  attempts	  to	  rethink	  agency	  for	  childhood	  studies,	  drawing	  on	  
Foucault’s	  theorisations	  of	  power,	  Deleuze	  and	  Guattari’s	  concept	  of	  assemblage,	  
Bennett’s	  vital	  materialism,	  and	  Grosz’s	  account	  of	  freedom	  in	  Bergson.	  I	  argue	  
that:	  (i)	  agency	  is	  ambivalent,	  i.e.	  it	  has	  no	  intrinsic	  ethical	  value;	  (ii)	  agency	  is	  
not	  a	  property	  of	  individual	  children	  but	  happens	  within	  assemblages;	  (iii)	  it	  is	  
analytically	  useful	  to	  distinguish	  between	  more	  routine	  and	  more	  inventive	  
tendencies	  of	  agency;	  and	  (iv)	  agency	  arises	  in	  the	  relations	  between	  the	  organic	  
and	  the	  inorganic,	  as	  life	  actualises	  the	  virtual	  potential	  of	  matter	  for	  
indeterminacy.	  These	  ideas	  contribute	  to	  ongoing	  debates	  about	  agency	  within	  
the	  field,	  connect	  these	  debates	  with	  wider	  questions	  about	  children’s	  relations	  
with	  materials	  and	  nonhumans,	  and	  offer	  analytical	  resources	  for	  empirical	  
research	  on	  children’s	  agency.	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No	  one	  really	  knows	  what	  human	  agency	  is,	  or	  what	  humans	  are	  
doing	  when	  they	  are	  said	  to	  perform	  as	  agents.	  In	  the	  face	  of	  every	  
analysis,	  human	  agency	  remains	  something	  of	  a	  mystery.	  (Bennett,	  
2010:	  34)	  
	  
This	  paper	  contributes	  to	  recent	  attempts	  to	  rethink	  agency	  within	  childhood	  
studies.	  It	  does	  so	  via	  four	  linked	  arguments.	  I	  begin	  by	  expanding	  on	  critiques	  of	  
agency	  in	  the	  field,	  arguing	  that	  childhood	  studies	  could	  benefit	  from	  viewing	  
agency	  as	  (i)	  ethico-­‐politically	  ambivalent,	  and	  (ii)	  not	  the	  property	  of	  individual	  
subjects,	  but	  something	  that	  arises	  from	  the	  relations	  within	  heterogeneous	  
assemblages.	  These	  arguments	  draw	  on	  Foucault’s	  theorisations	  of	  power,	  
Deleuze	  and	  Guattari’s	  concept	  of	  the	  assemblage,	  and	  Bennett’s	  vital	  
materialism.	  I	  then	  develop	  these	  arguments	  further	  via	  Grosz’s	  Bergsonian	  
account	  of	  subjectivity,	  agency	  and	  freedom.	  These	  ideas	  suggest	  that	  (iii)	  it	  may	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be	  helpful	  to	  recognise	  a	  spectrum	  of	  children’s	  agencies,	  ranging	  from	  the	  more	  
routine	  to	  the	  more	  inventive,	  and	  (iv)	  children’s	  agencies	  arise	  not	  only	  through	  
the	  relations	  of	  assemblages,	  but	  more	  specifically	  in	  the	  margin	  of	  
indeterminacy	  produced	  by	  the	  relations	  between	  organic	  life	  and	  inorganic	  
matter,	  understood	  not	  as	  distinct	  realms	  but	  as	  opposing	  tendencies.	  
	  
I	  want	  to	  work	  towards	  a	  conception	  of	  agency:	  that	  intensifies	  its	  specificity	  
rather	  than	  flattening	  it	  out	  into	  more	  general	  concepts	  such	  as	  action,	  activity	  or	  
movement;	  that	  recognises	  both	  the	  radically	  transformative	  potential	  of	  agency	  
and	  its	  propensity	  to	  be	  channeled	  through	  established	  patterns	  and	  structures;	  
and	  that	  recognises	  the	  complementary	  roles	  played	  by	  both	  living	  beings	  and	  
non-­‐living	  materials	  in	  constituting	  agency.	  The	  theorisation	  I	  am	  outlining	  also	  
resists	  the	  temptation	  to	  see	  certain	  kinds	  of	  agency	  as	  intrinsically	  superior	  to	  
others,	  instead	  recognising	  the	  ambivalence	  of	  all	  forms	  of	  agency.	  
	  
The	  theorists	  whose	  work	  I	  draw	  on	  in	  this	  paper	  do	  not	  always	  sit	  easily	  
together,	  but	  their	  approaches	  do	  have	  certain	  resonances	  with	  each	  other,	  and	  I	  
have	  tried	  to	  tune	  into	  these.	  There	  are	  well-­‐known	  affinities	  between	  Foucault,	  
Deleuze	  and	  Guattari,	  and	  between	  Bergson	  and	  Deleuze,	  while	  Bennett	  makes	  
extensive	  use	  of	  Deleuze	  and	  Guattari’s	  concept	  of	  assemblage	  and	  Bergson’s	  
vitalism.	  I	  have	  therefore	  made	  connections	  between	  these	  thinkers	  and	  their	  
ideas,	  but	  at	  the	  same	  time	  there	  is	  no	  aspiration	  to	  forge	  them	  into	  a	  coherent	  
whole.	  For	  Bennett,	  in	  particular,	  the	  Bergsonian	  distinction	  between	  organic	  
and	  inorganic	  does	  not	  go	  far	  enough	  in	  establishing	  agency	  as	  something	  
immanent	  to	  matter,	  and	  I	  try	  to	  address	  this	  critique	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  paper.	  
	  
Rethinking	  children’s	  agency	  1:	  Power	  and	  assemblages	  
In	  the	  new	  social	  studies	  of	  childhood,	  the	  idea	  that	  children	  are	  active	  social	  
agents	  became	  a	  familiar	  mantra	  from	  the	  1990s	  onwards.	  This	  position	  worked	  
against	  ingrained	  tendencies	  across	  research,	  policy	  and	  practice	  to	  treat	  
children	  as	  intrinsically	  lesser	  beings,	  and	  helped	  to	  advance	  the	  case	  for	  
children’s	  rights	  (Esser	  et	  al.,	  2016).	  Initially,	  agency	  was	  not	  subject	  to	  much	  
conceptual	  scrutiny	  in	  the	  new	  social	  studies	  of	  childhood:	  “The	  agency	  of	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children	  as	  actors	  is	  often	  glossed	  over,	  taken	  to	  be	  an	  essential,	  virtually	  
unmediated	  characteristic	  of	  humans	  that	  does	  not	  require	  much	  explanation.”	  
(Prout,	  2011:	  7)	  
	  
Over	  the	  last	  decade	  or	  so,	  however,	  critical	  thinking	  about	  agency	  has	  been	  
gathering	  momentum	  in	  the	  field:	  
	  
…	  a	  counter-­‐movement	  is	  emerging	  which	  does	  not	  reject	  the	  
importance	  of	  studying	  children	  as	  social	  actors	  who	  are	  exercising	  
agency	  but	  which	  is	  critical	  of	  the	  tendency	  in	  childhood	  studies	  to	  
treat	  children’s	  agency	  in	  a	  celebratory,	  uncritical,	  a-­‐theoretical,	  non-­‐
relational,	  locally-­‐bound	  and	  non-­‐reflective	  manner	  (Huijsmans,	  
2011:	  1308).	  
	  
This	  body	  of	  work	  has	  included	  attempts	  to	  critique,	  refine	  or	  redefine	  agency	  in	  
various	  ways	  (Tisdall	  and	  Punch,	  2012;	  Oswell,	  2013;	  Hackett	  et	  al.,	  2015;	  Esser	  
et	  al.,	  2016),	  including	  in	  relation	  to	  questions	  of	  scale	  (Ansell,	  2009),	  children’s	  
voices	  (Komulainen,	  2007;	  Kraftl,	  2013),	  children’s	  eating	  habits	  (Eßer,	  2017),	  
children	  living	  on	  the	  streets	  (Davies,	  2008;	  Bordonaro,	  2012),	  children	  living	  
through	  armed	  conflict	  (Seymour,	  2012),	  participatory	  methods	  (Gallacher	  and	  
Gallagher,	  2008;	  Holland	  et	  al.,	  2010),	  schools	  and	  early	  years	  institutions	  
(Teague,	  2014;	  Guo	  and	  Dalli,	  2016),	  institutional	  practices	  of	  inclusion	  (Dalkilic	  
and	  Vadeboncoeur,	  2016),	  and	  child	  protection	  social	  work	  (Ackermann	  and	  
Robin,	  2016),	  to	  name	  just	  a	  few	  examples.	  
	  
These	  debates	  raise	  the	  question	  of	  whether	  there	  is	  anything	  distinctive	  about	  
the	  agency	  of	  children,	  as	  compared	  to	  human	  agency	  in	  general	  (see	  for	  example	  
Punch,	  2002).	  More	  profoundly,	  following	  posthumanist	  accounts	  of	  agency,	  
some	  of	  this	  work	  begins	  to	  consider	  whether	  and	  how	  the	  agencies	  of	  children	  
and	  humans	  ought	  to	  be	  distinguished	  from	  the	  agencies	  of	  other	  kinds	  of	  beings	  
such	  as	  other	  animals,	  plants,	  technologies	  or	  minerals.	  To	  give	  a	  preliminary	  
answer	  to	  these	  questions,	  the	  argument	  that	  I	  am	  developing	  in	  this	  paper	  
draws	  on	  post-­‐structuralist	  thinking	  to	  emphasise	  the	  specificity	  of	  particular	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agencies	  as	  they	  flow	  within	  particular	  assemblages,	  and	  the	  relational	  quality	  of	  
agency,	  as	  something	  that	  happens	  in	  the	  relations	  between	  the	  different	  bodies	  
within	  a	  given	  assemblage.	  In	  other	  words,	  the	  question	  of	  whether	  children’s	  
agency	  is	  distinct	  from	  that	  of	  adults	  is	  unanswerable,	  because	  children’s	  agency	  
is	  not	  a	  property	  of	  children	  but	  an	  effect	  arising	  within	  relations	  between	  
children	  and	  various	  other	  kinds	  of	  beings.	  Children	  will	  exercise	  agency	  in	  
radically	  different	  ways	  in	  different	  assemblages.	  Depending	  on	  what	  
assemblage	  is	  being	  analysed,	  agency	  might	  be	  observed	  flowing	  between	  
children	  and	  adults,	  children	  and	  objects,	  children	  and	  machines,	  children	  and	  
animals,	  or	  amongst	  any	  combination	  of	  these	  and	  other	  kinds	  of	  bodies.	  The	  
analysis	  of	  children’s	  agency,	  from	  this	  point	  of	  view,	  requires	  close	  attention	  to	  
“where	  and	  how,	  between	  whom,	  between	  what	  points,	  according	  to	  what	  
processes,	  and	  with	  what	  effects,	  power	  is	  applied.”	  (Foucault,	  2007:	  2)	  	  
	  
These	  processes	  are	  what	  any	  analysis	  of	  children’s	  agency	  needs	  to	  address.	  	  
The	  aim	  of	  this	  paper	  is	  thus	  to	  develop	  some	  conceptual	  tools	  that	  can	  sharpen	  
attention	  to	  how	  children	  are	  operating	  within	  agentic	  assemblages.	  There	  is	  no	  
prospect,	  within	  such	  an	  approach,	  of	  making	  general	  statements	  about	  the	  
agency	  of	  children	  per	  se.	  It	  is	  possible,	  however,	  to	  examine	  specific	  
assemblages	  in	  which	  children	  play	  a	  central	  role	  –	  families,	  childcare	  settings,	  
schools,	  public	  and	  private	  spaces,	  and	  so	  on	  –	  and	  the	  techniques,	  practices	  and	  
relations	  through	  which,	  within	  these	  assemblages,	  children’s	  agency	  is	  elicited,	  
expressed,	  channeled,	  restricted	  and	  so	  forth.	  
	  
The	  concept	  of	  assemblage	  I	  am	  using	  is	  derived	  from	  Deleuze	  and	  Guattari	  
(1987).	  It	  provides	  a	  more	  open-­‐ended	  alternative	  to	  understanding	  children	  as	  
situated	  in	  socio-­‐cultural	  contexts.	  Assemblage	  is	  an	  approximate,	  and	  arguably	  
inaccurate,	  translation	  of	  the	  French	  word	  agencement,	  indicating	  an	  
arrangement	  or	  layout	  of	  heterogenous	  elements	  (Nail,	  2017).	  Assemblages,	  on	  
this	  view,	  are	  collections	  of	  bodies	  in	  relation	  with	  one	  another.	  These	  bodies	  
may	  include	  children,	  adults,	  materials,	  technologies,	  spaces,	  bodies	  of	  ideas	  or	  
discourses	  –	  in	  principle,	  any	  kind	  of	  body.	  This	  kind	  of	  heterogeneity	  is	  also	  part	  
of	  Foucault’s	  concept	  of	  dispositif,	  usually	  translated	  as	  apparatus,	  which	  he	  used	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to	  refer	  to	  networks	  of	  power	  relations	  between	  different	  bodies.	  Despite	  the	  
Foucaultian	  basis	  of	  this	  paper,	  I	  have	  chosen	  to	  dwell	  more	  on	  assemblage	  than	  
on	  apparatus,	  because	  the	  latter	  has	  a	  specificity	  that	  is	  not	  ideal	  for	  thinking	  
about	  agency.	  The	  apparatus,	  for	  Foucault,	  is	  a	  strategic	  configuration	  of	  power-­‐
knowledge	  that	  responds	  to	  some	  perceived	  social	  need	  or	  problem	  (Agamben,	  
2009).	  We	  can	  think,	  for	  example,	  of	  child	  development	  or	  child	  protection	  
systems	  as	  dispositifs	  in	  Foucault’s	  sense.	  Assemblages	  can	  also	  be	  strategic	  and	  
large	  scale,	  but	  equally	  they	  can	  be	  more	  tactical,	  temporary,	  small	  scale	  
formations.	  Assemblage	  is	  thus	  more	  widely	  applicable	  to	  any	  set	  of	  relations	  in	  
which	  children	  are	  involved.	  
	  
Assemblages,	  in	  Deleuze	  and	  Guattari’s	  use	  of	  the	  concept,	  have	  several	  key	  
features.	  First,	  they	  are	  defined	  by	  contingent	  relations	  between	  a	  set	  of	  bodies.	  
Second,	  the	  relations	  of	  an	  assemblage	  are	  in	  a	  process	  of	  continual	  becoming;	  
any	  apparent	  persistence	  is	  an	  effect	  of	  repetition	  rather	  than	  sameness.	  Third,	  
assemblages	  are	  not	  unities.	  Unlike	  organic	  bodies,	  they	  are	  not	  self-­‐contained	  
systems	  in	  which	  all	  the	  parts	  form	  a	  coherent	  whole,	  where	  each	  part	  has	  a	  
defined	  and	  essential	  function	  without	  which	  the	  whole	  cannot	  exist.	  Rather,	  
assemblages	  are	  multiplicities	  of	  related	  elements,	  which	  can	  be	  reconfigured	  or	  
combined	  with	  new	  elements.	  Deleuze	  and	  Guattari	  repeatedly	  refer	  to	  
assemblages	  as	  machinic,	  indicating	  this	  capacity	  for	  reconfiguration	  and	  
coupling.	  Within	  an	  assemblage,	  different	  permutations	  and	  combinations	  of	  
elements	  can	  produce	  different	  effects,	  and	  machinic	  assemblages	  can	  also	  be	  
plugged	  into	  other	  assemblages,	  again	  producing	  unforeseen	  results.	  The	  
assemblage	  of	  child	  will	  operate	  differently	  when	  coupled	  with	  the	  assemblage	  of	  
family,	  as	  compared	  to	  the	  assemblage	  of	  school,	  for	  example,	  or	  the	  assemblage	  
of	  neighbourhood.	  
	  
Hooking	  up	  Deleuze	  and	  Guattari’s	  concept	  of	  assemblage	  with	  Foucault’s	  ideas	  
about	  power	  has	  the	  potential	  to	  advance	  the	  critiques	  of	  children’s	  agency	  
outlined	  above.	  Thinking	  with	  these	  concepts	  amplifies	  two	  issues	  in	  particular,	  
which	  I	  will	  discuss	  in	  turn	  below:	  the	  first	  concerns	  how	  agency	  is	  valued	  in	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childhood	  studies;	  the	  second	  concerns	  how	  agency	  is	  attributed	  to	  individual	  
children.	  
	  
In	  the	  new	  social	  studies	  of	  childhood,	  there	  is	  a	  tendency	  –	  by	  no	  means	  
universal,	  but	  common	  enough	  to	  be	  identifiable	  –	  to	  view	  agency	  as	  a	  force	  that	  
can	  liberate	  children	  from	  structural	  constraints,	  and	  as	  such	  something	  that	  
should	  be	  more	  fully	  acknowledged,	  valued	  and	  encouraged.	  This	  view	  of	  agency	  
is	  evident,	  for	  example,	  in	  the	  discourse	  advocating	  participatory	  and	  co-­‐
production	  methods	  in	  research	  with	  children	  (e.g.	  Kellett	  et	  al.,	  2004).	  Whilst	  
helpful	  as	  part	  of	  an	  emancipatory	  politics,	  the	  promotion	  and	  celebration	  of	  
children’s	  agency	  can	  sometimes	  verge	  on	  romanticizing	  children’s	  actions,	  
making	  it	  more	  difficult	  to	  see	  how	  agency	  is	  ethically	  ambivalent.	  If	  we	  
understand	  agency	  as	  a	  type	  of	  micro-­‐power	  then,	  following	  Foucault,	  it	  can	  be	  
defined	  as	  actions	  that	  affect	  other	  actions	  (Foucault,	  1983).	  Such	  actions	  do	  not	  
have	  any	  intrinsic	  ethical	  value.	  The	  ethics	  of	  power	  depend	  on	  how	  power	  is	  
being	  exercised,	  over	  which	  bodies,	  through	  which	  relations,	  apparatuses	  and	  
techniques.	  Power	  may	  have	  effects	  of	  liberation,	  domination,	  subversion,	  
colonisation,	  persuasion,	  participation,	  co-­‐operation,	  intensification	  or	  
attenuation	  of	  conflict	  and	  so	  on.	  
	  
Typologies	  of	  agency	  often	  come	  with	  values	  attached,	  either	  implicitly	  or	  
explicitly.	  Davies	  (1994),	  for	  example,	  distinguishes	  between	  subversive	  and	  
transformative	  agency,	  and	  implies	  that	  the	  latter	  is	  more	  valuable	  for	  
empowerment.	  From	  a	  post-­‐structuralist	  perspective,	  such	  claims	  are	  difficult	  to	  
make	  outside	  of	  a	  specific	  empirical	  situation.	  As	  a	  form	  of	  power,	  agency	  is	  too	  
ambivalent	  to	  have	  specific	  ethical	  functions	  attributed	  to	  it.	  The	  same	  technique	  
of	  power	  may	  flip	  from	  being	  liberatory	  to	  being	  oppressive	  depending	  on	  how	  it	  
is	  deployed,	  and	  within	  what	  assemblage,	  such	  that	  it	  is	  impossible	  ever	  to	  
guarantee	  liberation.	  Childhood	  studies	  research	  has	  documented	  how	  
discourses	  of	  agency	  and	  voice,	  ostensibly	  designed	  to	  facilitate	  inclusion	  and	  
empowerment,	  may	  actually	  function	  in	  a	  regulatory	  way,	  enforcing	  norms	  about	  
how	  children	  should	  behave,	  and	  excluding	  those	  whose	  bodies	  do	  not	  or	  cannot	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conform	  to	  the	  dominant	  model	  (MacLure	  et	  al.,	  2010;	  Komulainen,	  2007;	  
Dalkilic	  and	  Vadeboncoeur,	  2016).	  
	  
As	  for	  the	  issue	  of	  attributing	  agency	  to	  children,	  Foucault’s	  middle	  to	  late	  work	  
provides	  compelling	  analyses	  of	  how	  human	  subjectivity,	  far	  from	  being	  an	  
essential	  part	  of	  human	  nature,	  is	  produced	  through	  various	  technologies	  of	  
power.	  From	  this	  perspective,	  agency	  cannot	  be	  attributed	  to	  children	  as	  a	  
pregiven	  capacity.	  It	  is	  rather	  an	  effect	  of	  the	  development	  of	  a	  type	  of	  selfhood	  
that	  enables	  a	  person	  to	  understand	  themselves,	  and	  be	  understood	  by	  others,	  as	  
capable	  of	  decisive	  action.	  For	  Foucault,	  we	  become	  subjects	  of	  power	  by	  first	  
being	  subject	  to	  power	  (Butler,	  1997).	  This	  type	  of	  selfhood	  is	  especially	  
prevalent	  in	  liberal	  democracies,	  where	  state	  power	  works	  by	  shaping,	  eliciting	  
and	  harnessing	  the	  agency	  of	  subjects	  to	  regulate	  themselves.	  Foucault’s	  term	  for	  
this	  mode	  of	  power	  was	  governmentality	  (Foucault,	  1992).	  Childhood	  is	  a	  life	  
stage	  where	  subjects	  are	  in	  their	  early	  stages	  of	  formation,	  and	  as	  such	  is	  
targeted	  with	  particular	  intensity	  by	  the	  apparatuses	  of	  governmentality	  (as	  
evident	  in	  the	  apparatus	  of	  early	  intervention	  for	  example).	  
	  
The	  subject,	  on	  this	  view,	  is	  formed	  through	  such	  a	  profound	  ingraining	  of	  
biological-­‐cultural-­‐historical-­‐material	  patterns	  that	  it	  is	  difficult,	  in	  some	  cases	  
perhaps	  impossible,	  for	  selves	  to	  then	  break	  free	  from	  or	  operate	  outside	  of	  
these	  patterns.	  Yet	  the	  social	  and	  political	  forces	  of	  liberal	  humanism	  place	  so	  
much	  value	  on	  the	  individual	  that	  there	  is	  a	  constant	  imperative	  to	  attribute	  
agency	  to	  people:	  to	  see	  subjects	  as	  the	  main	  source	  of	  action	  and	  meaning,	  as	  
ultimately	  in	  charge	  of,	  and	  responsible	  for,	  everything	  significant	  that	  happens.	  
Such	  narratives	  of	  individual	  human	  mastery	  downplay	  the	  role	  of	  the	  
assemblage,	  the	  myriad	  “memories,	  intentions,	  contentions,	  intestinal	  bacteria,	  
eyeglasses,	  and	  blood	  sugar…the	  plastic	  computer	  keyboard,	  the	  bird	  song	  from	  
the	  open	  window,	  or	  the	  air	  or	  particulates	  in	  the	  room,	  to	  name	  only	  a	  few	  of	  the	  
participants”	  (Bennett,	  2010:	  23).	  In	  childhood	  studies,	  part	  of	  the	  difficulty	  with	  
agency	  is	  that	  it	  has	  been	  used	  in	  ways	  that	  attribute	  significant	  actions	  to	  
children,	  despite	  the	  fact	  that	  in	  any	  significant	  action	  there	  are	  always	  many	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bodies	  and	  forces	  at	  work,	  both	  internal	  and	  external	  to	  the	  analytical	  unit	  of	  
‘child’.	  
	  
Foucault’s	  thought	  reminds	  us	  that	  claims	  to	  agency	  are	  never	  neutral	  
descriptions.	  They	  are	  forms	  of	  power-­‐knowledge	  that	  forge	  subjects.	  
Encouraging	  thought	  to	  locate	  agency	  within	  an	  individual	  human	  actor	  is	  an	  
implicitly	  humanist	  move,	  silencing	  the	  role	  of	  other	  kinds	  of	  beings,	  bodies	  and	  
forces	  in	  making	  things	  happen.	  As	  Eßer	  (2017:	  286)	  suggests,	  childhood	  studies	  
has	  been	  “too	  focused	  on	  an	  individualistic	  concept	  of	  agency…	  Starting	  from	  this	  
criticism,	  there	  has	  been	  a	  shift	  from	  a	  substantialist	  and	  isolated	  view	  of	  
children’s	  agency	  towards	  more	  connected	  and	  related	  forms	  of	  agency.”	  This	  
shift	  reflects	  wider	  developments	  in	  social	  theory	  such	  as	  actor	  network	  theory,	  
new	  materialism,	  post-­‐humanism	  and	  vital	  materialism,	  all	  of	  which	  set	  out	  
ontologies	  in	  which	  agency	  arises	  within	  heterogeneous	  assemblages,	  rather	  
than	  being	  a	  capacity	  located	  within	  individual	  bodies.	  Bennett	  (2010:	  21)	  puts	  it	  
like	  this:	  
	  
…	  an	  actant	  never	  really	  acts	  alone.	  Its	  efficacy	  or	  agency	  always	  
depends	  on	  the	  collaboration,	  cooperation,	  or	  interactive	  interference	  
of	  many	  bodies	  and	  forces.	  A	  lot	  happens	  to	  the	  concept	  of	  agency	  
once	  nonhuman	  things	  are	  figured	  less	  as	  social	  constructions	  and	  
more	  as	  actors,	  and	  once	  humans	  themselves	  are	  assessed	  not	  as	  
autonomous	  but	  as	  vital	  materialities.	  
	  
It	  should	  be	  emphasised	  that	  this	  line	  of	  thinking	  does	  not	  discount	  the	  
possibility	  that	  children	  might	  be	  important	  mediators,	  nodes,	  conduits	  or	  
centres	  of	  agency.	  Such	  functions	  can	  only	  arise,	  however,	  within	  the	  relations	  of	  
a	  larger	  assemblage:	  
	  
The	  task	  becomes	  to	  identify	  the	  contours	  of	  the	  swarm	  and	  the	  kind	  
of	  relations	  that	  obtain	  between	  its	  bits.	  To	  figure	  the	  generative	  
source	  of	  effects	  as	  a	  swarm	  is	  to	  see	  human	  intentions	  as	  always	  in	  
competition	  and	  confederation	  with	  many	  other	  strivings,	  for	  a	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human	  intention	  is	  like	  a	  pebble	  thrown	  into	  a	  pond,	  or	  an	  electrical	  
current	  sent	  through	  a	  wire	  or	  neural	  network:	  it	  vibrates	  and	  merges	  
with	  other	  currents,	  to	  affect	  and	  be	  affected.	  This	  understanding	  of	  
agency	  does	  not	  deny	  the	  existence	  of	  that	  thrust	  called	  intentionality,	  
but	  it	  does	  see	  it	  as	  less	  definitive	  of	  outcomes.	  (Bennett,	  2010:	  32)	  
	  
These	  critiques	  raise	  the	  question	  of	  whether	  agency	  should	  be	  entirely	  
abandoned	  as	  a	  concept.	  Ingold,	  for	  instance,	  argues	  that	  it	  is	  a	  mistake	  to	  
attribute	  agency	  to	  people	  or	  objects,	  as	  though	  it	  were	  a	  property	  lodged	  within	  
bodies,	  and	  instead	  advocates	  an	  animist	  ontology,	  in	  which	  beings	  are	  
understood	  as	  lines	  of	  movement	  (Ingold,	  2006).	  From	  this	  perspective,	  the	  
world	  is	  not	  a	  static	  container	  for	  various	  objects,	  but	  a	  shifting	  meshwork	  
woven	  by	  the	  lines	  of	  movement	  of	  beings,	  in	  their	  unfolding	  relations	  with	  each	  
other.	  For	  Ingold	  what	  matters	  is	  movement,	  not	  agency.	  
	  
Yet	  perhaps	  agency	  has	  not	  yet	  outlived	  its	  usefulness	  for	  childhood	  studies,	  
despite	  the	  problems	  outlined	  above.	  Adults	  who	  spend	  time	  researching,	  
working	  with	  or	  parenting	  children	  often	  remark	  on	  how	  children	  routinely	  act	  
decisively,	  in	  ways	  that	  appear	  to	  have	  significant	  effects	  on	  the	  assemblages	  of	  
which	  they	  are	  part.	  These	  acts	  are	  often	  remarkable	  because,	  compared	  to	  many	  
other	  actants	  in	  the	  assemblages	  of	  which	  they	  are	  part,	  children	  have	  limited	  
access	  to	  structural	  resources	  such	  as	  money,	  status	  and	  language,	  limited	  
physical	  power,	  a	  relatively	  smaller	  repertoire	  of	  skills,	  and	  so	  on.	  Despite	  these	  
structural	  constraints,	  even	  small	  babies	  find	  ways	  to	  command	  adult	  attention,	  
express	  preferences,	  refuse	  things	  they	  do	  not	  like,	  get	  more	  of	  what	  they	  want,	  
and	  constantly	  stretch	  the	  limits	  of	  their	  own	  capabilities.	  We	  could	  say	  that	  
children	  exercise	  agency	  despite	  their	  vulnerabilities,	  but	  another	  way	  to	  put	  this	  
would	  be	  that	  they	  exercise	  agency	  through	  their	  vulnerabilities.	  Vulnerability	  in	  
this	  sense	  is	  not	  a	  lack	  but,	  following	  Butler	  and	  others	  (e.g.	  Butler	  et	  al.,	  2016),	  a	  
radical	  openness	  to	  being	  affected	  by	  events,	  which	  is	  fundamental	  to	  the	  ability	  
of	  life	  to	  feel,	  grow,	  change	  and	  act,	  but	  which	  also	  necessarily	  places	  bodies	  at	  
increased	  risk	  of	  harm.	  The	  intensity	  of	  this	  relation	  between	  children’s	  
vulnerabilities	  and	  their	  capacities	  for	  action	  is	  sociologically	  compelling.	  Whilst	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children’s	  decisive	  actions	  always	  happen	  in	  relations	  with	  other	  kinds	  of	  beings	  
and	  objects,	  often	  children	  appear	  to	  be	  key	  players	  in	  shaping	  these	  relations	  –	  
never	  the	  only	  players,	  but	  certainly	  players	  worth	  taking	  seriously.	  In	  many	  
cases,	  children	  find	  ways	  to	  exercise	  something	  that	  looks	  like	  agency	  in	  spite	  of	  
or	  against	  the	  dominant	  orientations	  of	  the	  power	  relations	  within	  an	  
assemblage.	  
	  
Having	  rehearsed	  some	  of	  the	  difficulties	  with	  the	  concept	  of	  agency	  in	  childhood	  
studies,	  and	  suggested	  that	  the	  concept	  of	  assemblage	  might	  provide	  a	  helpful	  
way	  of	  rethinking	  agency,	  the	  next	  section	  of	  this	  paper	  develops	  this	  rethinking	  
further,	  drawing	  on	  Elizabeth	  Grosz’s	  Bergsonian	  account	  of	  subjectivity	  and	  
freedom.	  For	  childhood	  studies,	  I	  argue	  that	  these	  ideas	  are	  helpful	  in	  suggesting	  
that	  (i)	  agencies	  may	  be	  more	  routine	  or	  more	  inventive,	  and	  that	  these	  are	  very	  
different	  tendencies;	  and	  (ii)	  agency	  can	  be	  understood	  as	  arising	  in	  the	  margin	  
of	  indeterminancy	  produced	  through	  relations	  between	  the	  organic	  and	  the	  
inorganic.	  
	  
Rethinking	  children’s	  agency	  2:	  Freedom	  and	  materiality	  
Writing	  about	  feminism,	  materialism,	  and	  freedom,	  Grosz	  states	  that	  her	  interest	  
is	  not	  in	  articulating	  how	  women	  can	  become	  ‘free	  from’	  external	  forms	  of	  power	  
such	  as	  patriarchy,	  but	  rather	  in	  how	  women	  might	  intensify	  their	  ‘freedom	  to’	  
act	  in	  ways	  that	  make	  the	  world	  different.	  This	  thinking	  can	  be	  transposed	  to	  
help	  think	  about	  children,	  focusing	  attention	  not	  on	  how	  to	  free	  them	  from	  the	  
structures	  of	  adult	  oppression,	  how	  to	  ‘give	  them’	  power,	  rights	  and	  a	  voice,	  but	  
on	  how	  children	  can	  and	  do	  exercise	  forms	  of	  freedom.	  The	  concepts	  of	  agency	  
and	  freedom,	  whilst	  related,	  are	  clearly	  not	  interchangeable,	  and	  it	  is	  freedom	  in	  
which	  Grosz	  appears	  to	  be	  most	  interested.	  As	  I	  will	  show	  later	  in	  the	  paper,	  
however,	  how	  Grosz	  defines	  freedom	  helps	  to	  distinguish	  between	  agencies	  that	  
are	  more	  routine	  and	  those	  that	  are	  more	  inventive.	  Her	  discussion	  of	  freedom	  is	  
thus	  helpful	  for	  refining	  the	  analysis	  of	  agency.	  
	  
Grosz	  draws	  heavily	  on	  Bergson	  to	  make	  three	  key	  arguments.	  The	  first	  is	  that	  
freedom	  is	  best	  understood	  not	  as	  a	  property	  of	  subjects	  but	  as	  a	  quality	  of	  acts.	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For	  Bergson,	  free	  acts	  are	  those	  that	  spring	  from	  the	  subject	  and	  express	  the	  
whole	  of	  the	  subject.	  Such	  acts	  “are	  integral	  to	  who	  or	  what	  the	  subject	  is”	  
(Grosz,	  2010:	  144),	  but	  for	  Bergson	  –	  as	  for	  Foucault,	  Deleuze	  and	  Guattari	  –	  
subjects	  are	  always	  becoming,	  so	  free	  acts	  cannot	  express	  the	  identity	  of	  a	  
coherent,	  stable	  self.	  Rather,	  free	  acts	  are	  precisely	  those	  acts	  which	  can	  be	  
appropriated	  by,	  and	  incorporated	  into,	  subjective	  processes	  of	  becoming.	  If	  we	  
define	  agency	  as	  this	  process	  of	  free	  actions,	  flowing	  through	  subjects,	  whose	  
effects	  of	  change	  are	  then	  “retroactively	  integrated	  into	  the	  subject’s	  history	  and	  
continuity”	  (Grosz,	  2010:	  146),	  then	  agency	  is	  not	  just	  an	  event	  in	  which	  a	  
becoming	  subject	  acts	  –	  it	  is	  the	  very	  event	  of	  that	  becoming	  itself,	  an	  event	  that	  
changes	  both	  the	  acting	  subject	  and	  the	  world:	  “Free	  acts	  are	  those	  which	  both	  
express	  us	  and	  which	  transform	  us,	  which	  express	  our	  transforming”	  (Grosz,	  
2010:	  146).	  
	  
Grosz	  emphasises	  that	  this	  kind	  of	  freedom	  is	  not	  about	  choice	  between	  a	  range	  
of	  alternative	  options	  that	  are	  known	  in	  advance	  and	  then	  selected	  by	  an	  agent.	  
Bergson	  rather	  thinks	  of	  freedom	  in	  a	  way	  that	  is	  similar	  to	  Nietzsche’s	  idea	  of	  
the	  will	  to	  power,	  as	  the	  intensive	  quality	  by	  which	  certain	  acts	  make	  a	  
difference,	  rather	  than	  the	  movement	  of	  choosing	  from	  amongst	  different	  
options:	  “It	  is	  not	  a	  freedom	  of	  selection,	  of	  consumption,	  a	  freedom	  linked	  to	  the	  
acquisition	  of	  objects	  but	  a	  freedom	  of	  action	  that	  is	  above	  all	  connected	  to	  an	  
active	  self,	  an	  embodied	  being,	  a	  being	  who	  acts	  in	  a	  world	  of	  other	  beings	  and	  
objects”	  (Grosz,	  2010:	  147).	  
	  
In	  this	  line	  of	  thinking,	  it	  is	  less	  that	  subjects	  exercise	  agency	  and	  more	  that	  
agency	  is	  the	  process	  by	  which	  subjects	  are	  transformed.	  This	  idea	  can	  be	  
expanded	  on	  via	  Foucault’s	  work	  on	  what	  he	  referred	  to	  as	  techniques	  or	  
technologies	  of	  the	  self,	  defined	  as:	  	  
	  
…	  those	  intentional	  and	  voluntary	  actions	  by	  which	  men	  not	  only	  set	  
themselves	  rules	  of	  conduct,	  but	  also	  seek	  to	  transform	  themselves,	  to	  
change	  themselves	  in	  their	  singular	  being,	  and	  to	  make	  their	  life	  into	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an	  oeuvre	  that	  carries	  certain	  aesthetic	  values	  and	  meets	  certain	  
stylistic	  criteria	  (Foucault,	  1984:	  10-­‐11).	  
	  
This	  idea	  of	  subjects	  shaping	  themselves	  may	  seem	  like	  a	  radical	  departure	  from	  
Foucault’s	  earlier	  work	  on	  how	  subjects	  are	  formed	  by	  apparatuses	  of	  power	  
external	  to	  them,	  but	  Butler	  (1997)	  describes	  how	  these	  two	  forms	  of	  power	  are	  
in	  fact	  intimately	  linked	  a	  fundamental	  ambivalence	  of	  agency:	  that	  although	  the	  
agency	  of	  the	  subject	  presupposes	  the	  subject’s	  subordination,	  this	  agency	  
exceeds	  the	  subordinating	  power	  which	  enabled	  it:	  
	  
Power	  considered	  as	  a	  condition	  of	  the	  subject	  is	  necessarily	  not	  the	  
same	  as	  power	  considered	  as	  what	  the	  subject	  is	  said	  to	  wield.	  The	  
power	  that	  initiates	  the	  subject	  fails	  to	  remain	  continuous	  with	  the	  
power	  that	  is	  the	  subject’s	  agency.	  (Butler,	  1997:	  12)	  	  
	  
Indeed,	  many	  of	  the	  subjective	  capacities	  that	  neoliberal	  apparatuses	  of	  
biopower	  try	  to	  drum	  into	  children	  –	  the	  ability	  to	  take	  responsibility	  for	  their	  
actions,	  comply	  with	  rules,	  self-­‐regulate	  and	  self-­‐manage	  –	  are	  aimed	  at	  
producing	  subjects	  who	  co-­‐operate	  by	  governing	  themselves.	  In	  so	  doing,	  
however,	  these	  processes	  of	  subjection	  produce	  subjects	  who	  are	  also	  well-­‐
equipped	  to	  transform	  themselves	  in	  ways	  that	  are	  not	  tied	  to	  the	  agenda	  of	  the	  
governmental	  apparatus.	  It	  is	  this	  latter	  kind	  of	  self-­‐transformative	  agency	  that,	  
for	  Foucault	  –	  and	  I	  think	  for	  Grosz	  too	  –	  constitutes	  our	  best	  hope	  of	  freedom.	  
	  
The	  second	  key	  feature	  of	  Grosz’s	  Bergsonian	  account	  of	  freedom	  is	  that	  free	  acts	  
are	  far	  less	  common	  than	  the	  everyday	  forms	  of	  agency	  that	  are	  often	  described	  
in	  the	  childhood	  studies	  literature:	  
	  
Freedom	  is	  thus	  the	  exception	  rather	  than	  the	  rule	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  it	  
can	  function	  only	  through	  the	  “autonomy”	  of	  the	  living	  being	  against	  a	  
background	  of	  routinized	  or	  habituated	  activity.	  It	  is	  only	  insofar	  as	  
most	  of	  everyday	  life	  is	  accommodated	  through	  automatism,	  by	  a	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kind	  of	  reflex	  or	  habit,	  that	  free	  acts	  have	  their	  aesthetico-­‐moral	  force	  
and	  their	  effects	  on	  their	  author	  or	  agent.	  (Grosz,	  2010:	  148)	  
	  
In	  this	  respect,	  Bergson’s	  notion	  of	  freedom	  is	  significantly	  different	  to	  the	  
techniques	  of	  the	  self,	  which	  operate	  precisely	  by	  modifying	  habits.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  
Greek	  care	  of	  the	  self,	  Foucault	  (1986)	  shows	  how	  these	  techniques	  involved	  
daily	  work	  on	  mundane	  matters	  such	  as	  diet,	  exercise	  and	  regimen.	  Similar	  ideas	  
can	  be	  found	  in	  Nietzsche	  (2001:	  164),	  for	  whom	  exercising	  the	  will	  in	  a	  way	  that	  
shapes	  one’s	  own	  character	  requires	  “long	  practice	  and	  daily	  work”,	  and	  
Lefebvre	  (1991;	  2004),	  who	  sees	  repetitive	  everyday	  actions	  as	  an	  important	  
and	  often	  overlooked	  way	  through	  which	  change	  can	  happen.	  Such	  everyday	  
agencies	  can	  be	  contrasted	  with	  Foucault’s	  (2001)	  account	  of	  parrhesia,	  the	  
Greek	  term	  for	  the	  practice	  of	  speaking	  frankly	  and	  truthfully	  in	  circumstances	  
where	  it	  is	  risky	  to	  do	  so.	  Parrhesia	  is	  not	  everyday	  speech	  but	  a	  speech	  act	  
charged	  with	  an	  unusual	  intensity	  of	  courage,	  which	  as	  a	  result	  has	  the	  potential	  
to	  transform	  both	  the	  speaker	  and	  the	  interlocutors,	  and	  as	  such	  is	  closer	  to	  what	  
Grosz,	  after	  Bergson,	  means	  by	  freedom.	  
	  
These	  ideas	  could	  all	  be	  analytically	  useful	  in	  childhood	  studies,	  to	  help	  
differentiate	  between	  different	  kinds	  of	  agencies,	  relations	  and	  assemblages.	  In	  
particular,	  it	  might	  be	  beneficial	  to	  distinguish	  between:	  
	  
(i)	  Routine	  agencies	  that	  function	  through	  norms,	  patterns	  of	  response,	  reflexes,	  
habits	  and	  skills.	  Such	  routine	  agencies	  happen	  wherever	  bodies	  or	  forces	  act	  in	  
ways	  that	  develop	  or	  reproduce	  conventions,	  comply	  with	  rules	  or	  follow	  
patterns.	  Routine	  agency	  is	  not	  slavishly	  deterministic;	  even	  with	  ingrained	  
patterns	  of	  action,	  for	  something	  to	  constitute	  agency	  there	  needs	  to	  be	  room	  for	  
a	  degree	  of	  indeterminacy	  and	  improvisation.	  But	  routine	  agency	  never	  wholly	  
contravenes,	  overturns	  or	  reinvents	  established	  rules.	  	  
	  
(ii)	  More	  exceptional	  forms	  of	  agency	  that	  are	  animated	  by	  the	  kind	  of	  freedom	  
that	  Grosz	  is	  interested	  in.	  These	  inventive	  agencies	  break	  established	  patterns	  
and	  habits,	  redirect	  forces	  and	  significantly	  reconfigure	  relations.	  They	  are	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unexpected	  eruptions	  that	  disturb	  the	  status	  quo,	  usually	  in	  situations	  where	  
there	  is	  something	  at	  stake	  or	  an	  element	  of	  risk.	  Bodies	  through	  which	  this	  kind	  
of	  inventive	  agency	  flows	  are	  transformed	  by	  it,	  and	  in	  turn	  transform	  the	  
assemblages	  in	  which	  the	  body	  participates.	  
	  
No	  doubt	  there	  are	  agencies	  that	  do	  not	  fall	  neatly	  into	  either	  of	  these	  two	  
categories;	  they	  might	  be	  better	  understood	  as	  different	  tendencies	  rather	  than	  
discrete	  categories.	  There	  is	  some	  similarity	  here	  with	  Klocker’s	  idea	  of	  thin	  and	  
thick	  agencies	  (Klocker,	  2007),	  but	  those	  concepts	  relate	  to	  the	  extent	  of	  the	  
range	  of	  choices	  available	  to	  children.	  Recall	  that	  for	  Bergson	  freedom	  is	  not	  a	  
question	  of	  choice	  but	  rather	  of	  the	  intensity	  of	  indeterminacy	  in	  a	  given	  
assemblage.	  It	  is	  this	  intensity	  of	  indeterminacy	  that	  may	  be	  helpful	  in	  
distinguishing	  between	  different	  kinds	  of	  agency.	  It	  is	  also	  important	  to	  avoid	  
setting	  up	  a	  value	  hierarchy,	  with	  inventive	  agency	  seen	  as	  intrinsically	  superior	  
to	  routine	  agency.	  For	  example,	  Guo	  and	  Dalli	  (2016)	  show	  how	  in	  a	  New	  
Zealand	  early	  years	  setting,	  ‘small’	  agencies,	  based	  on	  fitting	  in	  with	  routines	  and	  
established	  language	  structures,	  enabled	  immigrant	  Chinese	  children	  to	  develop	  
a	  sense	  of	  belonging.	  All	  kinds	  of	  agencies	  may	  serve	  all	  kinds	  of	  ethico-­‐political	  
functions.	  The	  aim	  of	  distinguishing	  between	  different	  kinds	  of	  agency	  is	  not	  to	  
privilege	  some	  forms	  over	  others,	  but	  to	  provide	  better	  analytical	  purchase	  on	  
the	  multitude	  of	  forms	  of	  action	  often	  lumped	  together	  under	  the	  rubric	  of	  
agency.	  	  
	  
To	  show	  how	  this	  distinction	  between	  routine	  and	  inventive	  agencies	  might	  be	  
useful	  for	  empirical	  work	  in	  childhood	  studies,	  take	  the	  example	  of	  recent	  
research	  showing	  that	  young	  children	  are	  capable	  of	  becoming	  proficient	  and	  
enthusiastic	  users	  of	  digital	  technologies	  such	  as	  iPads	  (e.g.	  Lynch	  and	  Redpath,	  
2014;	  Flewitt	  et	  al.,	  2015).	  Within	  the	  new	  social	  studies	  of	  childhood	  paradigm,	  
such	  findings	  would	  appear	  to	  be	  evidence	  of	  children’s	  agency.	  Yet	  the	  devices	  
in	  question	  have	  been	  deliberately	  engineered	  to	  capture	  human	  attention	  so	  as	  
to	  generate	  surplus	  value.	  When	  children	  follow	  the	  routine	  functionality	  built	  
into	  iPads	  and	  other	  consumer	  technologies,	  their	  actions	  are	  not	  free	  in	  Bergson	  
and	  Grosz’s	  sense	  of	  the	  term.	  The	  technology	  is	  eliciting	  and	  shaping	  children’s	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action	  in	  a	  way	  that	  habituates	  them	  into	  its	  wider	  programme	  –	  for	  example,	  by	  
producing	  subjects	  who	  willingly	  generate	  data	  that	  can	  be	  used	  for	  algorithmic	  
processing,	  to	  serve	  the	  functions	  of	  what	  Deleuze	  (1992)	  calls	  societies	  of	  
control.	  Grosz’s	  account	  enables	  us	  to	  disinguish	  clearly	  this	  kind	  of	  agency	  from	  
transformative	  forms	  of	  agency.	  To	  repeat	  my	  earlier	  argument	  about	  the	  ethico-­‐
political	  ambiguity	  of	  agency:	  this	  is	  not	  to	  denigrate	  routine	  agencies,	  which	  
may	  have	  both	  beneficial	  and	  harmful	  effects.	  Nevertheless,	  it	  is	  analytically	  and	  
politically	  useful	  to	  be	  able	  to	  distinguish	  these	  routine	  agencies	  from	  events	  in	  
which	  less	  scripted	  forms	  of	  action	  take	  place,	  breaking	  out	  from	  the	  designed	  
parameters	  of	  technology.	  
	  
The	  inventive	  tendency	  of	  agency	  can	  be	  seen	  on	  the	  more	  rare	  occasions	  when	  
children	  and	  young	  people	  repurpose	  assemblages	  in	  unforeseen	  ways.	  In	  
relation	  to	  mobile	  technologies,	  one	  example	  is	  the	  ‘Teen	  Buzz’	  ring	  tone	  that	  
appropriates	  the	  sound	  of	  Mosquito	  devices.	  The	  Mosquito	  is	  a	  sonic	  technology	  
used	  to	  discourage	  young	  people	  from	  loitering	  in	  public	  spaces	  by	  generating	  
high	  frequency	  buzzing	  that	  can	  produce	  discomfort.	  High	  frequency	  noise	  
disproportionately	  affects	  the	  youthful,	  whose	  hearing	  range	  typically	  extends	  
higher	  than	  that	  of	  older	  people	  as	  a	  result	  of	  age-­‐related	  hearing	  loss	  (Saladin,	  
2014).	  The	  device	  plays	  on	  auditory	  physiology	  to	  exercise	  spatial	  power,	  
circumscribing	  territory	  in	  a	  way	  that	  explicitly	  and	  deliberately	  enacts	  age-­‐
based	  discrimination.	  The	  sound	  was	  infamously	  repurposed	  as	  a	  ring	  tone	  for	  
young	  people’s	  mobile	  phones,	  nicknamed	  ‘Teen	  Buzz’,	  enabling	  them	  to	  detect	  
incoming	  text	  messages	  in	  a	  way	  that	  is	  less	  audible	  to	  adult	  surveillance,	  in	  
school	  classrooms	  for	  example.	  The	  ring	  tone	  can	  be	  heard	  –	  or	  not	  heard,	  
depending	  on	  the	  condition	  of	  your	  auditory	  physiology	  –	  at	  the	  Mosquito	  
Ringtones	  website:	  http://www.freemosquitoringtones.org/.	  
	  
Teen	  Buzz	  is	  an	  inventive	  and	  ingenious	  mis-­‐use	  of	  technology.	  Again	  it	  is	  
important	  to	  emphasise	  that	  these	  qualities	  do	  not	  make	  it	  intrinsically	  ethically	  
‘good’;	  it	  could	  easily	  be	  used	  to	  help	  propagate	  bullying	  and	  abusive	  messages.	  
The	  point	  is	  that	  the	  appropriation	  of	  the	  Mosquito	  sound	  represents	  a	  greater	  
degree	  of	  freedom	  in	  the	  sphere	  of	  technology	  than	  routine	  use	  of	  devices.	  It	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plugs	  together	  two	  technological	  assemblages	  –	  the	  mobile	  phone	  and	  the	  
Mosquito	  Device	  –	  to	  actualise	  previously	  hidden	  potentials	  within	  them.	  
	  
The	  third	  key	  argument	  in	  Grosz’s	  account	  of	  Bergson	  is	  that	  freedom	  arises	  
from	  relations	  between	  the	  organic	  and	  inorganic,	  between	  life	  and	  matter.	  For	  
Bergson,	  the	  organic	  and	  the	  inorganic	  are	  related	  tendencies	  rather	  than	  
separate	  realms	  –	  Bennett	  (2010:	  76)	  refers	  to	  them	  as	  strivings,	  propensities	  
and	  leanings,	  that	  only	  exist	  in	  relation	  to	  each	  other.	  The	  tendency	  of	  organic	  life	  
is	  characterised	  by	  what	  Bergson	  called	  élan	  vital,	  which	  is	  a	  drive	  towards	  
movement,	  activity,	  change,	  surprise	  and	  the	  division	  of	  life	  into	  new	  forms:	  “The	  
task	  of	  élan	  vital	  is	  to	  shake	  awake	  that	  lazy	  bones	  of	  matter	  and	  insert	  into	  it	  a	  
measure	  of	  surprise”	  (Bennett,	  2010:	  78).	  The	  inorganic	  is	  the	  opposite	  
tendency,	  a	  drive	  towards	  stability	  and	  durability,	  providing	  life	  with	  enough	  
regularity	  to	  persist,	  to	  anchor	  itself	  and	  “perform	  habitual	  actions	  with	  a	  
measure	  of	  some	  guarantee	  of	  efficacy”	  (Grosz,	  2010:	  151).	  In	  Deleuzian	  terms,	  
we	  could	  say	  that	  the	  organic	  is	  what	  produces	  difference	  while	  the	  inorganic	  
produces	  repetition	  –	  with	  difference	  and	  repetition	  understood	  as	  mutually	  
constitutive	  rather	  than	  opposed.	  An	  obvious	  example	  relating	  to	  childhood	  is	  
the	  way	  that	  a	  school	  classroom,	  as	  a	  formation	  of	  inorganic	  matter,	  can	  persist	  
over	  time	  in	  a	  relatively	  stable	  form,	  while	  the	  children	  who	  live	  through	  that	  
classroom,	  appropriating	  its	  materials	  for	  learning,	  grow,	  change	  and	  move	  on.	  
	  
Again,	  on	  this	  account	  freedom	  is	  not	  a	  property	  that	  resides	  in	  subjects	  or	  
indeed	  in	  any	  kind	  of	  being,	  object	  or	  body.	  Freedom	  rather	  arises	  through	  the	  
relations	  between	  living	  beings	  and	  materials,	  insofar	  as	  these	  relations	  produce	  
indeterminacy.	  The	  inorganic	  materials	  of	  the	  universe	  contain	  within	  them	  the	  
virtual	  potential	  for	  indeterminacy,	  and	  organic	  life	  actualises	  these	  virtual	  
potentials	  by	  appropriating	  and	  reworking	  materials	  in	  ways	  that	  maximise	  
indeterminacy.	  This	  movement	  of	  indetermination,	  for	  Bergson,	  is	  the	  force	  of	  
life.	  Life	  in	  turn	  renews	  inorganic	  matter	  and	  its	  potential	  for	  indeterminancy	  
though	  posthumous	  processes	  of	  decomposition,	  the	  organic	  always	  eventually	  
returning	  to	  the	  inorganic	  from	  which	  it	  arose.	  Returning	  to	  the	  different	  
tendencies	  of	  agency	  discussed	  above,	  it	  would	  appear	  that	  more	  routine	  forms	  
18	  
	  
of	  agency	  stick	  closer	  to	  the	  contours	  of	  the	  inorganic,	  working	  within	  a	  narrow	  
margin	  of	  indeterminacy,	  while	  more	  inventive	  forms	  of	  agency	  push	  matter	  
further,	  yielding	  a	  greater	  degree	  of	  indeterminacy.	  
	  
Bennett	  (2010)	  argues	  that	  while	  Bergson’s	  thinking	  here	  points	  in	  the	  right	  
direction	  it	  does	  not	  go	  far	  enough,	  because	  it	  continues	  a	  long	  tradition	  of	  
rendering	  matter	  inert.	  She	  find	  this	  framing	  insufficient	  for	  developing	  a	  politics	  
that	  recognises	  the	  power	  of	  things	  and	  the	  distribution	  of	  agency	  throughout	  
heterogeneous	  assemblages.	  Without	  getting	  into	  a	  detailed	  conceptual	  
discussion	  of	  this	  criticism,	  I	  want	  to	  suggest	  that	  the	  organic/inorganic	  
distinction	  may	  be	  useful	  in	  childhood	  studies	  for	  analytical	  reasons,	  particularly	  
when	  it	  comes	  to	  engaging	  children,	  practitioners	  and	  childhood	  studies	  students	  
in	  thinking	  about	  their	  relations	  with	  the	  material	  world	  in	  ways	  that	  might	  
initially	  seem	  counter-­‐intuitive.	  If	  we	  want	  to	  rework	  childhood	  studies	  analyses	  
to	  argue	  that,	  for	  example,	  children’s	  eating	  is	  shaped	  by	  the	  agencies	  of	  food	  
(Eßer,	  2017),	  or	  that	  groundwater	  is	  an	  agent	  that	  affects	  children’s	  relations	  
with	  place	  (Horton	  and	  Kraftl,	  2017),	  then	  starting	  with	  a	  Bergsonian	  distinction	  
between	  inorganic	  and	  the	  organic	  –	  understood	  as	  tendencies	  in	  productive	  
tension	  with	  each	  other,	  rather	  than	  mutually	  exclusive	  categories	  –	  might	  help	  
to	  make	  sense	  of	  the	  fact	  that	  there	  are	  clearly	  different	  kinds	  of	  agency	  involved	  
in	  these	  situations,	  and	  that	  these	  agencies	  may	  not	  be	  straightforwardly	  
comparable.	  
	  
Latour’s	  way	  of	  dealing	  with	  this	  problem	  is	  to	  describe	  nonhumans	  as	  actants	  
rather	  than	  agents	  (e.g.	  Johnson,	  1988),	  while	  Ingold’s	  solution	  is	  to	  let	  go	  of	  the	  
concept	  of	  agency	  in	  favour	  of	  animacy,	  and	  let	  go	  of	  the	  concept	  of	  objects	  in	  
favour	  of	  things	  (Ingold,	  2006;	  Ingold,	  2011).	  Such	  concepts	  are	  more	  capacious	  
than	  agency	  in	  encompassing	  multiple	  forms	  of	  action	  flowing	  through	  multiple	  
kinds	  of	  bodies,	  materials	  and	  forces,	  but	  they	  come	  with	  the	  risk	  of	  reducing	  
analytical	  specificity.	  Starting	  with	  the	  assumption	  that	  everything	  is	  animate,	  
that	  everything	  is	  acting	  or	  moving,	  is	  not	  particularly	  helpful	  for	  distinguishing	  
between	  different	  kinds	  of	  action	  or	  movement.	  Bergson’s	  distinction	  between	  
organic	  and	  inorganic	  tendencies	  offers	  an	  orientation	  that	  neither	  sets	  humans	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apart	  from	  all	  other	  beings	  nor	  completely	  flattens	  out	  ontology.	  A	  focus	  on	  the	  
relations	  between	  the	  organic	  and	  the	  inorganic	  allows	  a	  recognition	  of	  the	  
significant	  differences	  between	  these	  two	  tendencies,	  whilst	  also	  acknowledging	  
their	  mutually	  constitutive	  relations,	  and	  without	  privileging	  one	  over	  the	  other.	  
From	  this	  perspective,	  it	  is	  through	  the	  relations	  between	  the	  organic	  and	  the	  
inorganic	  that	  agency	  happens,	  and	  thus	  it	  is	  to	  these	  relations	  that	  analyses	  of	  
children’s	  agency	  ought	  to	  attend.	  
	  
Conclusion	  
In	  this	  paper	  I	  have	  attempted	  to	  rethink	  agency	  in	  a	  way	  that	  responds	  to	  
critiques	  of	  the	  concept	  in	  childhood	  studies.	  Informed	  by	  Foucault’s	  accounts	  of	  
power,	  Deleuze	  and	  Guattari’s	  concept	  of	  assemblage,	  Bennett’s	  vital	  materialism	  
and	  Grosz’s	  account	  of	  freedom	  in	  Bergson,	  I	  have	  set	  out	  a	  version	  of	  agency	  
that	  tries	  to	  intensify	  the	  specificity	  of	  the	  concept,	  rather	  than	  flattening	  it	  out	  
into	  something	  more	  general	  such	  as	  movement,	  animacy	  or	  action.	  I	  have	  made	  
four	  arguments:	  
	  
1.	  Agency	  is	  ambivalent.	  It	  does	  not	  have	  intrinsic	  ethical	  value.	  The	  ethics	  of	  
agency	  can	  only	  be	  determined	  by	  examining	  the	  specific	  effects	  of	  specific	  kinds	  
of	  agencies	  –	  how	  they	  are	  being	  exercised,	  through	  which	  bodies,	  through	  which	  
relations	  and	  assemblages.	  
	  
2.	  Attributing	  agency	  to	  individual	  children	  obscures	  more	  than	  it	  reveals.	  
Agency	  is	  better	  thought	  of	  as	  a	  quality	  of	  acts	  that	  happen	  within	  heterogeneous	  
assemblages.	  This	  line	  of	  thinking	  does	  not	  discount	  children’s	  agency	  or	  
intentions.	  Rather	  it	  seeks	  to	  analyse	  these	  things	  as	  forces	  that	  emerge	  from,	  
and	  contribute	  to,	  larger	  assemblages.	  
	  
3.	  It	  may	  be	  helpful	  to	  think	  of	  different	  tendencies	  of	  agency,	  from	  more	  routine	  
to	  more	  inventive.	  Routine	  agencies	  function	  by	  establishing	  or	  reproducing	  
patterns	  of	  response,	  as	  when	  children	  follow	  conventions,	  rules	  or	  habits.	  
Inventive	  agencies	  are	  more	  unexpected,	  erupting	  in	  ways	  that	  break	  established	  
patterns,	  redirect	  forces	  and	  reconfigure	  relations.	  They	  transform	  both	  the	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bodies	  through	  which	  they	  flow	  and	  the	  assemblages	  in	  which	  those	  bodies	  
participate.	  In	  keeping	  with	  principle	  1,	  neither	  of	  these	  kinds	  of	  agency	  can	  be	  
considered	  intrinsically	  superior.	  Both	  can	  serve	  all	  kinds	  of	  ethico-­‐political	  
functions.	  
	  
4.	  The	  distinction	  made	  by	  Bergson	  between	  the	  organic	  and	  the	  inorganic	  helps	  
to	  displace	  humanist	  and	  human	  exceptionalist	  accounts	  of	  agency,	  whilst	  still	  
differentiating	  between	  life	  and	  matter.	  Again,	  the	  organic	  and	  inorganic	  are	  to	  
be	  understood	  as	  tendencies	  rather	  than	  discrete	  categories.	  Organic	  life	  tends	  
towards	  movement	  and	  transformation,	  seeking	  to	  maximise	  indeterminacy	  
through	  its	  relations	  with	  materials.	  Inorganic	  matter	  tends	  towards	  stability	  
and	  durability,	  enabling	  life	  to	  persist.	  The	  two	  tendencies	  are	  always	  related	  
and,	  once	  again,	  neither	  should	  be	  privileged	  over	  the	  other.	  
	  
I	  offer	  these	  principles	  not	  as	  an	  attempt	  to	  finally	  answer	  the	  question	  of	  what	  
agency	  is	  in	  childhood	  studies,	  but	  in	  precisely	  the	  opposite	  spirit:	  to	  throw	  some	  
additional	  ideas	  into	  the	  mix	  of	  debates	  about	  children’s	  agency,	  to	  help	  shift	  
attention	  onto	  what	  agency	  does,	  how	  it	  flows	  in	  relations,	  and	  to	  provide	  
analytical	  resources	  for	  exploring	  children’s	  relations	  with	  other	  kinds	  of	  bodies,	  
forces	  and	  materials.	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